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 Non-technical summary 
It is largely documented that public science has a positive impact on industrial 
innovation. Previous studies, for instance, provide evidence for enhanced corporate 
patenting and improved new product and process development in the corporate sector 
through scientific research results. However, most of these empirical studies focus on 
the U.S.  
For the European Economic Area, scholars and policy makers are rather sceptical with 
respect to emphasizing a large impact of science on corporate innovation: it has been 
claimed for about a decade that a so-called “European Paradox” exists. It describes 
the phenomenon that EU countries play a leading global role in terms of top-level 
scientific output, but lag behind in the ability of converting this strength into wealth-
generating innovations in the business sector.  
In this paper, we investigate the nexus between science and industry in order to 
identify potential problems of technology transfer from academia to industry in the 
European area. Focusing on the “paper trail” from academia to industry in terms of 
patent applications, we compare academic inventions that are patented in the scientific 
domain with those that are directly transferred to industry and hence, although 
invented by an academic patented by a firm.  
Our analysis of a sample of more than 4000 academic inventions by German 
professors suggests that there is indeed potential for improving science-industry 
interactions in Europe. Concretely, our results show that academic inventions 
assigned to corporations are rather applied and associated with short-run profits, while 
academic inventions patented by the academic sector are rather complex and exhibit a 
higher long-term value. This suggests that firms miss the opportunity to invest in 
basic technologies that promise higher returns in the long run. We interpret this 
finding as a lack of absorptive capacity by corporations that do not succeed in 
identifying and exploiting basic university inventions.  
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
Die einschlägige akademische Literatur dokumentiert weitreichend den positiven 
Einfluss von Universitäten und außeruniversitären Forschungseinrichtungen auf das 
Innovationsverhalten von Unternehmen. Dabei beziehen sich die meisten dieser 
Studien jedoch auf den nordamerikanischen Wirtschaftsraum.  
Mit Blick auf Europa zeigen sich sowohl Wirtschaftswissenschaftler als auch 
politische Entscheidungsträger skeptisch, wenn es darum geht, den 
Technologietransfer vom öffentlichen Sektor in die Industrie zu bewerten. Oftmals ist 
sogar von einem „Europäischen Paradox“ die Rede. Dieser Term bezeichnet die 
Mutmaßung, dass in Europa zwar akademische Spitzenforschung stattfindet, diese 
jedoch nicht den Weg in die Industrie, und somit in kommerzielle Innovationen, 
findet. 
Die vorliegende Studie befasst sich mit dem Technologietransfer an der Schnittstelle 
zwischen dem öffentlichem Wissenschaftssektor und der Industrie. Ein eingehender 
Vergleich von akademischen Erfindungen, die im öffentlichem Sektor patentiert 
werden, mit solchen, die direkt von der Wirtschaft als Patent angemeldet werden, 
zeigt auf, dass es sich hierbei um weitgehend verschiedene Arten von akademischen 
Erfindungen handelt.  
Basierend auf einer Stichprobe von mehr als 4000 Erfindungen deutscher 
Hochschulprofessoren zeigen wir, dass das Technologietransferpotential, das der 
öffentlichem Wissenschaftssektor bietet, von der Industrie nicht voll ausgeschöpft 
wird. Konkret legen unsere Ergebnisse nahe, dass Unternehmen in der freien 
Wirtschaft angewandte akademische Erfindungen bevorzugen, die einen kurzfristigen 
Gewinn versprechen, während sie vor dem Erwerb komplexer akademischer 
Erfindungen, deren technologisches Potential sich erst in der langen Frist realisiert, 
zurückschrecken. Dies legt nahe, dass Industrieunternehmen im Europäischen 
Wirtschaftraum nicht über die notwendigen Kapazitäten verfügen, um solche 
vielversprechenden Erfindungen zu identifizieren und/oder sich das patentierte 
Wissen anzueignen, um es in langfristige Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, Gewinne oder 
Unternehmenswachstum zu transferieren. 
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1 Introduction 
Assessing the impact of public science on industrial innovation has been discussed 
among economic scholars, professionals and policy makers since decades. Previous 
studies suggest a positive impact of research results produced in the public science 
sector on corporate patenting (Jaffe, 1989), productivity growth (Adams, 1990), new 
product and process development in firms (Cohen et al., 2002, Toole, 2007), and even 
the emergence of entirely new industries (Zucker and Darby, 1996, Zucker et al., 
1998). While the literature clearly establishes a positive relationship between 
investment in public science and (long-term) economic returns for a variety of 
dimensions and channels through which academe contributes to welfare this evidence 
is largely based on the United States. 
For the European Economic Area, in contrast, it has been claimed for about a decade 
that a so-called “European Paradox” exists (European Commission, 1995). Scholars 
argued that EU countries play a leading global role in terms of top-level scientific 
output, but lag behind in the ability of converting this strength into wealth-generating 
innovations. A highly critical review of the “paradox” and its subsequent possibly 
misguided policies can be found in Dosi et al. (2006). The authors claim that no 
overall “European Paradox” with leading science but weak downstream firms can be 
observed.2 Rather significant weaknesses occur in both sectors European public 
science and industry.  
In this paper, we focus on the nexus between science and industry and provide an in-
depth analysis of academic inventions that are transferred to corporations. We 
compare academic inventions that remain in the scientific domain with those that are 
directly transferred to industry. We show that there are systematic differences 
between both types of academic inventions. These findings contribute to our 
                                                 
2 The different conclusions about Europe’s scientific performance arise from different aggregate 
measures used in the different studies. While the European Commission (1995) focuses on the number 
of publication per non-BERD (Business Enterprises Expenditure on Research and Development), Dosi 
et al. (2006) use scientific publications per population as well as citations and top 1% publications per 
population to account for publication quality. They find that in particular the quality weighted measures 
show a gap between Europe and the U.S. It is debatable which benchmark for the scientific outcome is 
the most appropriate. 
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understanding of academic technology transfer and potential reasons behind the 
European paradox.  
Our analysis is based on the “paper trail” from academia to industry. As has been 
suggested by Thursby et al. (2009) we focus on patents that protect inventions of 
university faculty members. Academic patents can be assigned to corporations or to 
scientific entities (the academic inventor, public research institutes or universities). 
According to Thursby et al. (2009) academic inventions patented by the business 
sector represent consulting activities that did not involve university resources. For the 
U.S., the share of university inventions that is patented solely by corporations 
accounts for 26%. For Europe, this share is much higher, on average, with up to 80% 
for Sweden (Lissoni et al., 2008). The difference is explained by the fact that, unlike 
in the U.S. where universities may claim the property rights of their patented 
inventions since the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, academic inventions in most European 
countries were owned by the faculty inventors themselves until recently. In 
consequence, German university professors, for instance, typically commercialized 
their research through consultancy agreements with industry partners, through “more 
or less private deals” (Goddar, 2006). The financial benefits for the professor were 
either already included the remuneration for the inventions made under the 
collaborative project if these were to be directly transferred to the industry partner or 
the consulting contract included licensing regulations for these inventions (Goddar, 
2006).3   
The fact that the majority of European academic inventions reach industry directly is 
important for our study as it allows us to claim that we analyze one of the important 
science-industry technology transfer channels. Although there is the possibility that 
patents owned by academe may be licensed out to corporations, university licensing 
occurs only occasionally in Europe. In 2006, European TTOs had on average only 
                                                 
3 An immediate implication of these practices is that the contribution of European universities to 
business innovation development is largely underestimated if such science-industry collaborations are 
not taken into account (Geuna and Nesta, 2006, Verspagen, 2006, van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 
2007).  
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11.2 licenses, only 2.3 of which yielded a licensing revenue for the university 
(ProTon, 2006).4  
Focusing on patented academic inventions our analysis aims at investigating which of 
these inventions are issued to “scientific organizations” and which are directly owned 
by corporate entities.5 We estimate probability models for patent assignment in order 
to investigate whether basic academic inventions which are further away from market 
applications are transferred to the business sector or whether firms rather focus on 
short-term profits and solutions to topical problems when acquiring academic 
inventions. The ability to identify, acquire and exploit academic knowledge in 
Europe’s industry sector has been claimed to be weak (Dosi et al., 2006). In the 
absence of a certain degree of absorptive capacity firms are not capable to benefit 
from complex and fundamental scientific input. Our results are in favour of this 
hypothesis. Our analysis suggests that firms strive for short-term profits when 
acquiring scientific knowledge and that they are reluctant to acquire basic 
technologies. We interpret this finding as a lack of absorptive capacity in the business 
sector, on average. Corporations do not succeed in identifying and exploiting basic 
university inventions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section provides an 
overview on the institutional background for technology transfer from academe in 
Europe and related literature; section 3 summarizes our data; section 4 shows the 
empirical results and the final section concludes. 
2 Background 
2.1 Institutional Background 
It has been claimed for about a decade that a so-called “European Paradox” exists. 
This paradox was first mentioned in a green paper on innovation published by the 
                                                 
4 The estimated number is based on survey evidence for 325 European TTOs. The ProTon survey is the 
European equivalent of the AUTM (The Association of University Technology Managers) survey for 
the U.S. 
5 Note that for our present research question, the sequence in which the technology transfer events 
happen is not of primary interest. For our purpose, it does not matter whether a scientist invents 
something and then sells his or her idea to the business sector that subsequently takes out a patent or 
whether a company requests consultancy from a scientist that eventually results in a corporate patent.  
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European Commission (1995), in which the authors argue that EU countries play a 
leading global role in terms of top-level scientific output, but lag behind other 
industrialized nations in the ability of converting this strength into wealth-generating 
innovations. The reasoning given by most scholars is that European academic 
research is lagging behind the U.S. in several areas, and that European industry is 
relatively weak in some key technology areas that are important for future global 
competitiveness (Dosi et al., 2006). For instance, Europe shows lower presence in 
information and communication technologies and biotechnologies, has a lower 
propensity to innovate, and relatively weak participation in global oligopolies.  
The “European paradox” initiated significant policy initiatives towards enhancing 
technology transfer from science to industry. The assumption behind these policy 
interventions is that an increased attitude towards commercialization in public science 
will spur national competitiveness and wealth. The most prominent policy changes in 
many European countries were Bayh-Dole Act type of legislations. The Bayh-Dole 
Act in 1980 strengthened the patenting rights of U.S. universities (and small 
businesses) by granting them the right to patent and to retain ownership of their 
inventions even if these were financed through public resources.6 In return, 
universities take over the administrative tasks associated with commercializing 
discoveries and they bear the financial risks of filing a patent application including 
patent application fees. In return, inventors get part of the licensing revenues. 
Recently, several European countries as for instance Germany, Denmark, and Austria 
followed the U.S. example and abolished the so-called professor privilege.7 Under this 
exception from the law, professors were the only occupational group that had the right 
to claim ownership of their patented inventions, even if the underlying research was 
financed by the university (Kilger and Bartenbach, 2002). In consequence and as a 
result of a lack of professional TTOs at most European universities that would 
facilitate the commercialization procedure (Debackere and Veugelers, 2005), 
European academic inventors with an interest in commercialization did so without 
university involvement (Goddar, 2006, for Germany). This becomes visible in a very 
                                                 
6 Examples of studies on the effects of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act are Henderson et al. (1998), Mowery 
and Ziedonis (2002), Mowery et al. (2002), and Sampat et al. (2003). 
7 Similar changes in legislation took place in the UK and Belgium (van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 
2007) and France (della Malva et al., 2008). 
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low share of academic patents being assigned to European universities (Geuna and 
Nesta, 2006, Verspagen, 2006). For Germany, France and Italy, for instance, less than 
1% of all patents are assigned to universities. The share of corporate patents with 
faculty involvement is, however, much higher with 2.5% for each of the countries 
(Verspagen, 2006). Lissoni et al. (2008) estimate that the share of academic patents 
directly assigned to corporations ranges from 60% to 80% in Europe, whereas 
licensing activities of European universities as reported by ProTon (2006) is 
negligibly small.8 
The significance of these direct science-industry knowledge transfers through faculty-
inventorship in combination with corporate-assigneeship notwithstanding, they have 
received little attention in the previous academic literature (van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie, 2007). The few previous studies on that topic are based on surveys of faculty 
and/or industry personnel.9 In a recent study, Thursby et al. (2009) suggest to use 
academic inventions that are patented solely by corporations as a method of making 
such informal science-industry links visible. The authors find that about 26% of 
faculty patents in the U.S. are assigned to the corporate sector. Against the legal 
background in the U.S., one would expect that only very few academic patents are 
filed without the involvement of universities. In search for explanations for the high 
share of firm-owned faculty patents, Thursby et al. (2009) conducted interviews with 
TTO employees, faculty members and industry partners. The main reason given by all 
three groups of interview partners was that these patents are an outcome of faculty 
                                                 
8 The importance of university consulting for industry is also reflected in such endeavors as the “Berlin 
agreement”, a collaboration between the Berlin universities, industry partners and the company 
Patentverwertungsagentur ipal GmbH, which aims at defining a set of rules, describing the manner in 
which to deal with patentable inventions ensuing from research co-operations or assignments financed 
by industry. From the perspective of the industry partners it is most important to ensure that 
universities do not only transfer patented technologies but also provide consulting service and 
information on related inventions even if there is no invention to publish those (Goddar, 2006).  
9 The results of the Carnegie Mellon Survey show, for instance, that university consulting is very 
important and even relatively more important than patents and licenses from the viewpoint of industrial 
R&D personnel (Cohen et al., 1998). A correspondingly high share of U.S. university scientists 
engages in industry consulting (18%), in joint publication (16%) and commercialization activities with 
industry (15%) (Link et al., 2007, for university scientists and engineers with a Ph.D. at the 150 
Carnegie Extensive Doctoral/Research Universities in 2004/2005). First evidence for the importance of 
informal links for Germany shows that informal contacts increase the effectiveness of formal industry-
science links with respect to firms’ innovation performance (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008a, based on 
the German Community Innovation Survey). 
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consulting activities, in which no university resources were used.10 Interviews with 
TTO personnel further revealed that presumably less than 50% of the inventions made 
at universities are not commercialized through university TTOs but directly with an 
industry partner (Thursby et al., 2001). In their investigation of potential differences 
between academic inventions patented by universities themselves and those assigned 
to the business sector, Thursby et al. (2009) find that the university-owned academic 
patents correspond to rather basic inventions. They further find that inventor revenue 
schemes at universities impact their incentives to patent outside the university. Lastly, 
there are differences across scientific fields and the type of the university, i.e. whether 
it is public or private. 
In this paper, we follow Thursby et al. (2009) by investigating differences in 
academic patents assigned to science and corporations. Academic inventions are 
considered to be among the most important sources of knowledge for innovation 
activities in the U.S. (Cohen et al., 2002) and Europe (Arundel and Geuna, 2004). 
Against the background of Europe’s presumed difficulties of transferring knowledge 
into commercially successful innovation, our analysis contributes to the understanding 
of the reasons for the European paradox.  
2.2 Technological complexity of academic patents and absorptive capacity of 
industry partners 
Previous literature has documented that the nature of inventions produced in academia 
differs significantly from corporate inventions. While industry R&D is directed at 
commercial success, university research focuses on solving fundamental science 
questions (Trajtenberg et al., 1997). Scientific research aims at developing and testing 
theories in order to understand why certain phenomena occur. The results enable 
predictions for untried experiments. Also, the research process in both sectors differs. 
Academic research relies on a vivid discussion of earlier research results including a 
careful documentation of trial and error of the experiments taken out. Industry 
                                                 
10 A different reasoning for the high percentage of university-invented patents that are assigned to the 
corporate sector is given by Herzfeld et al. (2006). The authors interviewed the responsible persons for 
negotiating intellectual property of 54 R&D intensive U.S. firms. The results show that firms have 
great difficulties in dealing with TTOs on intellectual property issues arising from inexperience and a 
lack of business knowledge of TTO employees as well as from their tendency to inflate the commercial 
potential of their patents. Herzfeld et al. (2006) conclude that firms would try to by-pass the TTO if 
possible and engage directly with the university scientist or engineer. 
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research is mainly focused on exploitation of existing technologies in order to 
increase profits, e.g. by altering one component of an existing invention (Fleming and 
Sorensen, 2004).  
Previous studies have shown that acquisition of scientific research is beneficial for 
firms, as becomes for instance visible in increased R&D productivity (Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1998), enhanced patent quality (Cassiman et al., 2008) and reduced labor 
cost (Stern, 1999). Explanations for these beneficial effects of science in industry 
include the fact that science provides substantial guidance for industrial research by 
pointing out promising avenues for future technology development leading to 
efficiency enhancement and avoidance of wasteful R&D investments and 
experimentations (Fleming and Sorensen, 2004, Dasgupta and David, 1994, Hall et 
al., 2003, Crespi et al., 2006) or that university research has a higher importance for 
future technological development (Henderson et al., 1998).  
Scientific knowledge, however, cannot be absorbed by the firms without efforts. In 
order to benefit from science firms need to be able to identify, assimilate and exploit 
the relevant knowledge. In other words, a certain degree of “absorptive capacity” 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) is crucial for the transformation of scientific knowledge 
into innovations and higher firm performance (Hall et al., 2003, Fabrizio, 2009). The 
appropriation and exploitation of scientific results is not trivial as research is typically 
presented in a codified way so that the reader might not be provided with enough 
knowledge to utilize the research in the absence of related tacit knowledge (Dasgupta 
and David, 1994). Furthermore, research-related knowledge often resides with the 
researcher and is difficult to be transferred (von Hippel, 1994). Hence, industry 
partners need a certain level of in-house scientific competence in order to be able to 
successfully adapt scientific know-how (Fabrizio, 2009).  
In the European context, where industry is considered to be weak as compared to the 
U.S. (Dosi et al., 2006), corporations might lack the absorptive capacity that is 
necessary for the identification and exploitation of basic and science-intensive 
academic inventions although those have been found to exhibit a higher monetary 
value (Harhoff et al., 2003). Hence, we hypothesize that European firms are reluctant 
to acquire complex and science-intense university inventions and rather focus on 
technologies with an immediate commercialization potential and the power to block 
rivals. Patents can be used to block competitors’ innovation activities as they grant the 
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holder the right to exclude third parties from using the protected technology (Cohen et 
al., 2000, Blind et al., 2009). Accordingly, control over key patents can be an essential 
factor to maintain or enhance a firm’s position in technology markets. In the context 
of firm acquisitions, acquiring firms pay a significant premium for a patent portfolio 
which has the potential to deter entry into technology markets (Grimpe and 
Hussinger, 2008b). In fact, the blocking potential of a patent portfolio is at least as 
important for acquiring firms as its “building potential”11, especially if the acquired 
patents are technologically related to the acquirer’s patent portfolio (Grimpe and 
Hussinger, 2008c). 
3 Data and Variables 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
Our analysis is based on a database issued by the European Patent Office (EPO) and 
the OECD. The “EPO/OECD patent citations database” covers all patents applied for 
at the EPO since its foundation in 1978 and up to October 2006 as well as all patents 
applied for under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in which the EPO is 
designated, so-called “Euro-PCT applications”. In addition to detailed information on 
all patents and their citations, the dataset contains other information for each patent 
(technology classes, date of application and title) and each applicant and inventor 
(name and place of residence). An earlier version of this database is fully described 
and analyzed in Webb et al. (2005). 
From this database we extracted all applications involving at least one inventor 
residing in Germany, resulting in a total of 346,892 patent applications. We identified 
all patents invented by German professors by using the persons’ title “Prof. Dr.” and 
variations of that. The professor title is protected by the German criminal code (article 
132a) against misuse by unauthorized persons. Although not compulsory, it is 
common practice in Germany to use academic titles in official communications. 
Czarnitzki et al. (2007) conducted a test on the accuracy of this identification strategy 
for German Patent and Trademark Office (GPTO) and the EPO. They checked 
whether the names of professors appeared in the patent database without the title but 
                                                 
11 The building potential is defined as the contribution of the patent portfolio to the state of the art in a 
certain technology field. 
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with the same address in order to verify that the title field is always filled in the data. 
The verification of a sample of persons had shown that university professors (or 
professors at other higher education facilities such as polytechnical colleges) can be 
identified by their title with high precision. Czarnitzki et al. (2007) conclude that it 
basically never happens that inventor names appear sometimes with “Prof. Dr.” (or 
similar title) and sometimes without on other patents. Thus, we can safely argue that 
with focus on Germany this procedure delivers a listing of patents where professors 
are recorded as inventors. In total, we found 4,841 (granted) patents that list at least 
one faculty member between 1978 and 2000.  
To further check the completeness of our sample of academic patents, we compared 
the outcome with a similar search in the data from the GPTO. More precisely, we 
searched all patent applications that have an EPO equivalent at the GPTO and that list 
professors as inventors. We found only 112 applications in which the GPTO patent 
listed a professor, but not the equivalent EPO patent over the period 1990-2001.  
In the next step, we manually identified the ownership type of all academic patents in 
our sample. More specifically, we categorized the academic patents depending on 
whether they were assigned to a corporate entity, a university, a public research 
institute or to the professor who was listed as inventor. We also created a residual 
category for patents that were assigned to any other party than the aforementioned 
ones (mainly individuals without a professor title or government agencies). Finally, 
we deleted 89 patents which listed more than one type of assignee, leaving us with 
4,752 observations. 
3.2 Variables 
Similarly to Thursby et al. (2009), the aim of our multivariate analysis is to uncover 
partial correlations between assignment of academic patents to a specific type of 
organization and a set of patent characteristics. In doing so, we do not hypothesize 
causality between assignment and patent characteristics; instead, we posit that patent 
characteristics provide information about the type of research that led to the invention, 
which in turn can explain the type of assignment. 
We use two different models in our multivariate analysis. The first one is a binary 
model, for which the dependent variable is a dummy that takes on the value one if the 
focal patent was assigned to a corporate entity (the most frequent outcome), and zero 
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if it was assigned to a “scientific” assignee, broadly speaking. As discussed above, the 
latter type of organizations may be universities, public research institutes, the scientist 
who is also listed as inventor, or the residual category.  
Next, we estimate a series of probability models of assignment, where the dependent 
variables are categorical and take on different values according to the type of 
organization that owns the patent.  
Following the literature on patent quality and previous empirical studies, we use 
several patent characteristics that may be correlated with the likelihood of assignment 
to the one or the other type of organization.  
The number of backward citations: The search report published by the EPO yields 
information on the state of the art relevant for a given patent application. Backward 
citations determine the legal boundaries of an invention by citing a related body of 
work. Thus, one could hypothesize that applications containing references to a large 
number of related inventions are of more incremental nature. However, empirical 
evidence tends to uncover a positive effect of backward citations on the value of a 
patent (Harhoff et al., 2003), which suggests that the number of cited patent is more 
likely to refer to the extent of patenting in a given technological area (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001) and hence to the potential profitability of inventions falling into 
that domain.  
Share of X and Y backward citations: Backward citations at the EPO are classified 
into different categories by the examiner during the search procedure, according to 
their relevance for the evaluation of patentability of the invention. Two interesting 
categories for our purpose are: 
- "Type X" citations. References classified in this category indicate material that 
is potentially harmful to the novelty or inventive step requirements of the 
claimed invention, when the referenced document is taken alone. 
- "Type Y" citations indicate material that is potentially harmful to the inventive 
step requirement of the claimed invention, when the referenced document is 
combined with one or more other documents of the same category, such a 
combination being obvious to a person skilled in the art. 
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We include the sum of X and Y citations, relative to the total number of backward 
citations. This measure is presumably (inversely) correlated with the degree of 
novelty and/or inventive step of the claimed.  
The number of forward citations is defined as the number of citations received by a 
focal patent from any subsequent patent application and measures the “importance”, 
the “quality” or the “significance” of a patented invention. Previous studies have 
shown that forward citations are highly correlated with the social value of the 
patented invention (Trajtenberg, 1990, for the computer tomography industry) as well 
as with its private value (Harhoff et al., 1999, Hall et al., 2005). Furthermore, forward 
citations reflect the economic and technological “importance” as perceived by the 
inventors themselves (Jaffe et al., 2000) and knowledgeable peers in the technology 
field (Albert et al., 1991). In this paper we use citation data from the EPO that has 
been made recently available in machine readable format by the EPO and the OECD. 
The high correlation between the number of forward citations to EPO patents with 
patent value has been documented by Gambardella et al. (2008). 
We also include the share of forward X and Y citations, which accounts for the 
potential blocking power of a given patent. If a patent is listed as an X or Y reference 
in subsequent patents, it means that the owner of the original patent can potentially 
block the development of follow-on research by (potential) competitors (Hall and 
Harhoff, 2001, Guellec et al., 2008). This type of patents have been found to be of 
particular interest for firms (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008b,c), but we would not 
expect that the blocking potential of technologies is important for universities, public 
research institutes or academic applicants. 
For both types of citations, we employ two different measures. First, we use the 
number of citations received up to five years after publication. Second, we also 
include the number of citations received from the fifth year onward. The reason is that 
we expect the patents assigned to corporations to have different citation patterns than 
patents that remain in the scientific sector. More precisely, we expect patents in the 
scientific sector to be cited later than corporate patents (Sampat et al., 2003). The 
nature of early and late citations has been found to be different (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004). While early citations (in the first five years after the patent 
application) correlate with the importance and economic value of patents, later 
citations are only weakly correlated with economic value but can be seen as an 
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indication for the science-basedness of patents (Sampat et al., 2003). The more basic 
the patented invention is the longer it takes to be understood and used by others. 
The grant lag (in years) measures the time elapsed between the dates of grant and 
application of a focal patent. The duration of the examination procedure is, among 
other things, influenced by the complexity of the invention and the novelty of the 
technology (Harhoff and Wagner, 2005). Patents in emerging technologies will 
therefore have a greater grant lag and longer pendencies will then presumably reflect 
patents in nascent technology fields. This type of research is expected to increase the 
probability of assignment to “science”. 
Non-patent references (NPR) indicate that the examiner (or in rare cases the inventor) 
inserted at least one citation to the non-patent literature into the search report. While 
the meaning of NPRs is not unambiguous, there is some recognition of their use as an 
indicator of science-technology linkages (Callaert et al., 2004, Meyer, 2000, 
Schmoch, 1997). Therefore, patents containing NPRs may reflect inventions resulting 
from fundamental research and thus further away from market applications, which 
suggests increasing probability of assignment to “science”.  
Patent scope: Following Lerner (1994), we use the number of international patent 
classes (IPC), at the 4-digit level, assigned to the patent as a measure of patent scope. 
The number of IPC assignments is a proxy for the complexity of the invention 
(Harhoff and Wagner, 2006). Thus, the broader the scope of a patent is, the higher the 
expected likelihood of assignment to “science”. 
Number of inventors: We also include the number of inventors listed on the patent 
application in order to control for the scope of the project.   
Technology classes: We include 30 technology class dummies since some 
technologies, especially in emerging fields, might by nature be more likely to be 
assigned to the one or the other type of organization. We use the so-called OST-
INPI/FhG-ISI classification, which is based on a concordance with IPC assignments.  
Application years: Finally, we also include dummies for each application year, to 
control for any remaining unobserved economic fluctuation over time.  
 13
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the variables used in the multivariate analysis. 
Several patterns stand out from the comparison of academic patents by type of 
assignee. Academic patents assigned to corporations receive, on average, more 
forward citations than patents assigned to any other type of assignee up to five years 
after their publication. However, academic applicants receive more citations than the 
corporate ones after this period of five years has elapsed. This pattern is in line with 
the interpretation of late citation as an indication for the science intensity of patented 
technologies. In addition, corporate patents seem to have a higher “blocking 
potential” as measured by the share of forward X and Y citations. Academic patents 
assigned to Public Research Institutes (PRI) are more likely to cite non-patent 
references than patents assigned to other assignees, suggesting stronger scientific ties. 
The measures of complexity (grant lag and number of IPC assignments), have a 
higher average value for non-corporate organizations. Patents assigned to universities 
are included in the group of academic applicants, as there are only 18 of such cases 
over the period we study. Finally, patents assigned to corporations list more inventors; 
this was expected as firms have more resources than academic assignee to devote to a 
given project.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: academic patent applications (1978-2000) 
  Mean S.D. Min. Max.
# backward citations 3.671 2.378 0 19
share of X&Y backward citations 0.268 0.360 0 1
# forward citations (<5 years) 1.045 1.875 0 30
# forward citations (>5 years) 1.804 2.793 0 45
Share of forward X&Y citations (<5 years) 0.167 0.330 0 1
Share of forward X&Y citations (>5 years) 0.055 0.178 0 1
NPR 0.361 0.480 0 1
# IPC assignments 1.670 0.862 1 11
Grant lag 4.350 1.673 1 15
# inventors 3.435 2.104 1 21
# observations 4737 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: academic patents by type of assignee 
  Corporate assignee Academic appl. PRI Others 
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
# backward citations 3,556 2,312 4,315 2,574 3,603 2,432 4,345 2,780 
share of X&Y backward citations 0,268 0,363 0,286 0,359 0,233 0,338 0,280 0,357 
# forward citations (<5 years) 1,140 2,001 0,662 1,159 0,702 1,212 0,938 1,734 
# forward citations (>5 years) 1.755 2.807 2.280 3.038 1.612 2.262 1.628 2.184 
Share of forward X&Y citations (<5 years) 0,183 0,339 0,110 0,291 0,093 0,263 0,146 0,318 
Share of forward X&Y citations (>5 years) 0.053 0.176 0.063 0.196 0.053 0.171 0.062 0.173 
Non-patent refernce 0,369 0,483 0,279 0,449 0,434 0,496 0,327 0,471 
# IPC assignments 1,679 0,847 1,567 0,875 1,738 0,976 1,708 0,942 
Grant lag 4,303 1,657 4,639 1,702 4,431 1,651 4,381 1,988 
# inventors 3,709 2,147 1,868 1,305 3,193 1,583 2,832 1,546 
# observations 3740 559 325 113 
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4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Binary model of patent assignment 
As a first step in our analysis, we regress patent characteristics on a binary variable of 
assignment that takes on the value one if the patent was assigned to a corporation and 
zero if the patent is owned by a PRI, by the academic inventor, by a university or by 
any other type of organization. Panels A and C in Table 3 includes the residual 
category “other assignee types”, while it is excluded in Panels B and D, so that the 
dummy takes on the value zero if the patent was assigned to a PRI, to the academic 
inventor or to a university. In addition, we add the number of citations received after 
five years in panels C and D.  
The results reveal that backward citation measures have a poor predictive power, as 
none of the three backward looking measures is significant. However, forward 
looking measures have a higher explanatory power; “important” patents, those with a 
high number of forward citations (up to five years after publication), are more likely 
to be assigned to corporations, at least when the residual category is excluded (Panel 
B).  
Patents with potential “blocking power”, those with a high share of forward X and Y 
citations, are more likely to be assigned to corporations, too. This result was expected 
as corporate entities might be more interested in blocking the development of similar 
technologies by potential rivals. Patents with stronger scientific ties, as measured by 
the presence of at least one reference to the non patent literature, are less likely to be 
assigned to corporations and more likely to be assigned to the group of scientific 
assignees. This is likely to reflect the fact that these inventions result from 
fundamental research and are thus further away from market applications and 
therefore of lower immediate interest to corporations. Finally, both measures of 
complexity (number of IPC assignments and the grant lag), exhibit a negative effect 
on the probability of corporate assignment. Similarly to the references to the non-
patent literature, these variables are likely to proxy for more basic and fundamental 
research. 
In Panels C and D we introduce the number of forward citations received after five 
years. The results reveal that patents that are cited later (i.e. after five years) are more 
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likely to be assigned to “science” rather than corporations. This confirms our 
presumption that corporations tend to source knowledge which yields immediate 
returns and tend to ignore more basic patents that result in later applications.   
Table 3: Binary probit model of assignment 
  (A) (B) 
  Coeff.   S.E. Marg. Eff. Coeff.   S.E. Marg. Eff.
log # backward citations -0.026  0.042 -0.006 -0.018  0.046 -0.003 
Share of X&Y backward citations -0.017  0.068 -0.004 0.004  0.076 0.001 
# backward citations = 0 0.014  0.119 0.003 -0.037  0.129 -0.007 
log # forward citations (≤ 5 years) 0.079  0.110 0.019 0.259 ** 0.134 0.049 
Share of forward X&Y citations (≤ 5 years) 0.206 ** 0.095 0.050 0.214 ** 0.104 0.041 
# forward citations= 0 -0.118 ** 0.055 -0.029 -0.063  0.060 -0.012 
NPR -0.080  0.056 -0.020 -0.035  0.062 -0.007 
# IPC assignments -0.105 *** 0.027 -0.025 -0.107 *** 0.030 -0.020 
Grant lag -0.054 *** 0.015 -0.013 -0.065 *** 0.016 -0.012 
# inventors 0.189 *** 0.015 0.046 0.222 *** 0.017 0.042 
Constant 0.955 ** 0.42  0.754 * 0.424  
Appl. Years - test of joint significance χ2 (22) = 53.51*** Χ2 (22) = 43.81*** 
Tech. Classes -test of joint significance χ2 (28) = 401.82 *** χ2 (28) = 310.51*** 
  (C) (D) 
  Coeff.   S.E. Marg. Eff. Coeff.   S.E. Marg. Eff.
log # backward citations -0.016  0.042 0.010 -0.010  0.046 0.009 
Share of X&Y backward citations -0.004  0.068 0.017 0.014  0.076 0.014 
# backward citations = 0 0.008  0.119 0.029 -0.043  0.129 0.026 
log # forward citations (≤ 5 years) 0.138  0.111 0.027 0.315 ** 0.135 0.025 
log # forward citations (> 5 years) -0.120 *** 0.042 0.010 -0.128 *** 0.047 0.009 
Share of forward X&Y citations (≤ 5 years) 0.314 *** 0.087 0.021 0.268 *** 0.097 0.018 
Share of forward X&Y citations (> 5 years) -0.109  0.130 0.032 -0.062  0.147 0.028 
# forward citations= 0 0.002  0.069 0.017 -0.051  0.076 0.015 
NPR -0.071  0.056 0.014 -0.026  0.062 0.012 
# IPC assignments -0.098 *** 0.027 0.007 -0.102 *** 0.030 0.006 
Grant lag -0.051 *** 0.015 0.004 -0.063 *** 0.016 0.003 
# inventors 0.190 *** 0.015 0.003 0.223 *** 0.017 0.003 
Constant 0.967 ** 0.424  0.813 * 0.427  
Appl. Years - test of joint significance χ2 (22) = 57.03*** Χ2 (22) = 44.22*** 
Tech. Classes -test of joint significance χ2 (28) = 282.14 *** χ2 (28) = 221.41*** 
# observations 4737 4624 
Note: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Marginal effects are computed by 
holding all other variables constant at their mean. For dummy variables, we show the change in 
probability of each outcome type induced by a one-unit change in the right-hand side dummy variable 
4.2 Multinomial model of patent assignment 
Next, we estimate the probability of academic patent assignment using a multinomial 
logit model. The aim is to distinguish between the different types of scientific 
assignees versus firm assignees. In Tables 4 and 5 we show the change in probability 
of assignment for each type of organization induced by marginal changes in each of 
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the right-hand side variables, such that the rows in Tables 4 and 5 sum up to zero. 
Technology classes are aggregated in six broader areas and application years are 
included biennially to account for the low number of observations in some of the 
categories. As before, university assignment is included in the “academic applicant” 
type of assignment. In Table 5 and 7, patents from the residual category are excluded 
from the analysis, while they constitute a separate category in Table 4 and 6.  
Similarly to the probit model, there is no significant correlation between backward 
looking citation measures and assignment. The number of forward citations correlates 
positively with corporate assignment and negatively with PRI ownership. However, 
later citations have a negative impact on firm assignment and a positive one with 
academic ownership. Theses results confirm that patents that are further away from 
the market, are less likely to be assigned to corporate entities, and more likely to be 
assigned to one of the scientific assignees. This result is confirmed by the effect of 
complexity measures. Patents with NPRs or those that embed more complex 
technologies (measured by the grant lag and the number of IPC assignments) are 
negatively correlated with corporate assignment. 
Our results confirm the set of predictions outlined in Section 2. Overall, patents with 
short-run value as proxied by the number of forward citations received within five 
years are more likely to be assigned to corporations as do patents with high blocking 
potential, as measured by the share of X and Y forward citations. On the other hand, 
inventions that are further away from market applications are more likely to be 
assigned to “science”. We interpret this result as an indication of lack of absorptive 
capacity from the corporate sector, as firms do not seem to utilize more fundamental 
academic knowledge. This situation might be detrimental to their global 
competitiveness, since these patents might be highly valuable in the long run. Basic 
and complex knowledge may unlock and open new technological paths with potential 
applications that are far away from market applications. The underlying patents are 
therefore likely to be cited later. Hall et al. (2005) find that “unexpected” late citations 
(those not predicted by early citations) are strongly correlated with the market value 
of firms. Our result confirms that corporations tend to source (patented) knowledge 
from academia that is likely to yield immediate and more likely returns and tend to 
shy away from applications that are still further away from market applications. 
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It is assumed in the multinomial logit model that the disturbances for each category 
are independent. We tested the Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives (IIA) 
assumption using the Hausman-McFadden (1984) and the Small-Hsiao (1985) tests. 
The Hausman test was inconclusive in most cases whereas the Small-Hsiao test does 
not reject independence across categories, supporting the IIA assumption. To 
complement these results, we also performed Likelihood-Ratio (LR) tests of combing 
alternatives in order to determine whether certain categories can be collapsed. In both 
models, the LR tests (for all pairs of outcome categories) strongly reject the 




Table 4: Multinomial logit model on type of assignee 
  Corporation Acad. Appl. PRI Other 
  Marg. Eff.  S.E. Marg. Eff.  S.E. Marg. Eff.  S.E. Marg. Eff.  S.E. 
log # backward citations -0.011  0.008 0.007  0.005 -0.001  0.006 0.004  0.004 
share of X&Y backward citations 0.006  0.014 0.006  0.008 -0.014  0.010 0.002  0.006 
# backward citations = 0 0.009  0.024 -0.018  0.012 0.007  0.017 0.003  0.013 
log # forward citations (<5 years) 0.041 * 0.024 -0.011  0.014 -0.043 * 0.022 0.013 * 0.008 
Share of forward X&Y citations (<5 years) 0.039 * 0.020 -0.006  0.011 -0.031 ** 0.016 -0.002  0.008 
# forward citations= 0 -0.022 ** 0.011 0.011 * 0.006 0.006  0.008 0.005  0.005 
NPR -0.029 ** 0.012 -0.006  0.006 0.030 *** 0.009 0.005  0.005 
# IPC assignments -0.017 *** 0.006 0.006 ** 0.003 0.007 * 0.004 0.004 * 0.002 
Grant lag -0.014 *** 0.003 0.007 *** 0.002 0.006 *** 0.002 0.001  0.001 
# inventors 0.047 *** 0.003 -0.042 *** 0.002 -0.003  0.002 -0.003 ** 0.001 
Appl. year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Tech. class dummies Included Included Included Included 
# observations 4737 
Note: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Marginal effects are computed by holding all other variables constant at their mean. For dummy variables, 




Table 5: Multinomial logit model on type of assignee (excl. the category “others”) 
  Corporation Acad. Appl. PRI 
  Marg. Eff.   S.E. Marg. Eff.  S.E. Marg. Eff.  S.E. 
log # backward citations -0.007  0.008 0.007  0.005 0.000  0.006 
share of X&Y backward citations 0.008  0.013 0.006  0.008 -0.014  0.011 
# backward citations = 0 0.011  0.021 -0.019  0.012 0.008  0.017 
log # forward citations (<5 years) 0.052 ** 0.026 -0.010  0.014 -0.042 * 0.023 
Share of forward X&Y citations (<5 years) 0.039 ** 0.019 -0.007  0.012 -0.032 ** 0.016 
# forward citations= 0 -0.018 * 0.010 0.012 * 0.007 0.007  0.008 
NPR -0.024 ** 0.011 -0.006  0.006 0.030 *** 0.009 
# IPC assignments -0.014 *** 0.005 0.007 ** 0.003 0.007 * 0.004 
Grant lag -0.014 *** 0.003 0.008 *** 0.002 0.006 *** 0.002 
# inventors 0.045 *** 0.003 -0.042 *** 0.002 -0.003  0.002 
Appl. year dummies Included Included Included 
Tech. class dummies Included Included Included 
# observations 4624 
Note: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Marginal effects are computed by holding all other variables constant at their mean. For dummy variables,  
we show the change in probability of each outcome type induced by a discrete change from zero to one in the right-hand side dummy variable. 
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Table 6: Multinomial logit model on type of assignee 
  Corporation Acad. Appl. PRI Other 
  Marg. Eff. S.E. Marg. Eff. S.E. Marg. Eff. S.E. Marg. Eff. S.E. 
log # backward citations -0.008  0.008 0.005  0.005 -0.001  0.006 0.004  0.004 
share of X&Y backward citations 0.008  0.014 0.004  0.008 -0.014  0.011 0.002  0.006 
# backward citations = 0 0.008  0.024 -0.018  0.012 0.007  0.017 0.003  0.013 
log # forward citations (>5 years) 0.052 ** 0.026 -0.020  0.014 -0.046 ** 0.022 0.013 * 0.008 
log # forward citations (<5 years) -0.025 *** 0.009 0.024 *** 0.005 0.004  0.006 -0.003  0.004 
Share of forward X&Y citations (<5 years) 0.061 *** 0.019 -0.016  0.010 -0.039 *** 0.015 -0.006  0.008 
Share of forward X&Y citations (>5 years) -0.006  0.027 0.015  0.014 -0.016  0.021 0.007  0.010 
# forward citations= 0 -0.006  0.014 0.011  0.009 -0.003  0.010 -0.002  0.006 
NPR -0.028 ** 0.012 -0.007  0.006 0.030 *** 0.009 0.005  0.005 
# IPC assignments -0.015 *** 0.006 0.005 * 0.003 0.007 * 0.004 0.003  0.002 
Grant lag -0.013 *** 0.003 0.007 *** 0.002 0.005 ** 0.002 0.001  0.001 
# inventors 0.046 *** 0.003 -0.041 *** 0.002 -0.003  0.002 -0.003 ** 0.001 
Appl. year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Tech. class dummies Included Included Included Included 
# observations 4737 
Note: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Marginal effects are computed by holding all other variables constant at their mean. For dummy variables, 
we show the change in probability of each outcome type induced by a discrete change from zero to one in the right-hand side dummy variable 
 
 22
Table 7: Multinomial logit model on type of assignee (excl. the category “others”) 
  Corporation Acad. Appl. PRI 
  Marg. Eff. S.E. Marg. Eff. S.E. Marg. Eff. S.E. 
log # backward citations -0.005  0.008 0.005  0.005 0.000  0.006 
share of X&Y backward citations 0.010  0.013 0.004  0.008 -0.014  0.011 
# backward citations = 0 0.010  0.021 -0.018  0.012 0.008  0.018 
log # forward citations (>5 years) 0.064 ** 0.026 -0.019  0.014 -0.045 ** 0.023 
log # forward citations (<5 years) -0.028 *** 0.008 0.024 *** 0.005 0.004  0.007 
Share of forward X&Y citations (<5 years) 0.058 *** 0.018 -0.017 * 0.010 -0.040 *** 0.015 
Share of forward X&Y citations (>5 years) 0.001  0.025 0.015  0.014 -0.016  0.021 
# forward citations= 0 -0.008  0.013 0.010  0.009 -0.002  0.010 
NPR -0.023 ** 0.011 -0.007  0.006 0.030 *** 0.009 
# IPC assignments -0.013 ** 0.005 0.006 * 0.003 0.007 * 0.004 
Grant lag -0.013 *** 0.003 0.008 *** 0.002 0.006 *** 0.002 
# inventors 0.044 *** 0.003 -0.041 *** 0.002 -0.003 * 0.002 
Appl. year dummies Included Included Included 
Tech. class dummies Included Included Included 
# observations 4624 
Note: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Marginal effects are computed by holding all other variables constant at their mean. For dummy variables, 




Knowledge transfer from science to industry has been an important issue for 
European innovation policy during the last decades. Against the background of a 
European paradox, which describes the fact that top-level research in the European 
science sector does not translate into successful commercial exploitation, many 
initiatives to foster industry-science interaction have been launched. In a critical 
review, however, economic scholars suggest that a European paradox does not exist 
and that Europe’s backwardness if compared to the U.S. is explained by a relatively 
weak performance of both science and industry in certain fields (Dosi et al., 2006). In 
this study we focus on the junction of science and industry and investigate which 
academic inventions go directly to industry. The results shed new light on technology 
transfer from academe to industry and support our understanding of a potential 
European Paradox.  
Based on an empirical analysis of German academic patents we find that corporations 
favor collaborative agreements with academia that enable them to reap short term 
rather than, possibly more uncertain, long term returns. Our results further show that, 
in the European context, firms strive for academic inventions with a high blocking 
potential in technology markets. Academic patents issued to corporations appear to 
reflect less complex and fundamental inventions as compared to inventions that are 
patented by the science sector as is reflected by their forward citation pattern. The 
results support the argument that a weak corporate sector explains part of the 
European paradox. Firms seem to lack the necessary absorptive capacity that would 
enable them to identify and acquire the most promising scientific inventions possibly 
enhancing long term growth and competitiveness. As this is a necessary first step 
before commercialization can take place, firms and policy makers should pay 
attention to strengthening this stage of science-industry knowledge transfer. It is 
questionable whether it is a successful long-term strategy to focus on rather short-term 
benefits from science than aiming for the adoption of more complex and more basic 
university technologies. 
Finally, our results raise concerns whether the increased science-industry interactions 
and policy efforts to support those are effective. In another study, we show that the 
trend towards increased commercialization in the public science sector is 
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accompanied by a decrease in the average quality of academic inventions and that the 
abolishment of the German professors’ privilege coincides with an acceleration of this 
patent quality decline (Czarnitzki et al., 2008). The fact that the average quality of 
academic inventions decreases over time makes it potentially more difficult for 
industry to identify valuable inventions. Further, the novel fact that academic 
scientists are ought to patent through their universities rather than directly negotiating 
with business partners, as inferred by the abolishment of the German professors’ 
privilege, might have a further negative impact on science-industry collaborations. It 
has been argued in the U.S. context that firms face significant difficulties when 
dealing with TTO staff and that they prefer dealing with the scientists directly when 
possible (Herzfeld et al., 2006). In contrast to the U.S., professional TTOs were 
basically not existent in Germany and emerged only recently after the abolishment of 
the professors’ privilege. Hence, the effects of the abolishment of the professors’ 
privilege in the absence of a functioning system of technology transfer to industry via 
the university might slow down technology transfers.12 
Our analysis is not without limitations. We do not claim that the identified 
relationship between the patent characteristics and assigneeship are causal. Instead, 
we just identify multivariate correlations. In order to infer causality we would, first, 
have to know at which stage of the academic R&D process firms and professors 
contact each other, and second, find instrumental variables to account for a potential 
reverse causality between assigneeship and patent characteristics. Given the data at 
hand this is unfortunately not possible. It would require in-depth knowledge about the 
negotiation process between corporations and the TTOs and/or academic inventors as 
well as insights into the contractual agreements among parties.  
 
                                                 
12 In Germany, the Federal Ministry for Education and Research launched a large study on technology 
transfer in Germany in 1998/1999. Among other issues, the report found that most university TTOs 
have many tasks, but that they are largely understaffed to fulfill these in a professional manner. Most 
TTOs are only run by a single person or even on part-time basis (50% of a full-time equivalent person). 
See Schmoch et al. (2000) for the detailed report. 
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